The Italian Government Security primary market relies on a primary dealer system, i.e. the Treasury selects a group of intermediaries called Specialists, who benefit from a set of obligations and privileges attached to their status. Academic literature paid scant attention to one of the main privileges, namely the right to participate in reserved auction reopenings. This consists in the right to buy predetermined additional quantities of Government securities at the price settled at the auction. This paper attempts to price this privilege as a call option written on the auctioned bonds in the framework of the Cox -Ingersoll -Ross model. No matter the one-day life, the option has a value significantly different from zero. Moreover, the option value helps explaining part of the mispricing occurring on auction days between the primary and secondary market.
Introduction
One of the most important functions of the Italian Treasury is to finance the public debt at the lowest possible cost for a given level of risk. This makes a correct pricing of Government Securities (GS) extremely important. To this aim, the revenue-raising abilities of the issuance mechanism of GS is crucial, giving great prominence to the study of market conditions, security design and placement techniques. One of the most important elements of the latter is the adoption, as in many other countries (Arnone and Iden, 2003; Bagella et al., 2007) , of a primary dealer system to ensure the full placement of GS (Sareen, 2006) .
More specifically, the Treasury selects a group of intermediaries among the Primary Dealers of the official electronic wholesale secondary market for the Italian GS, Mercato
Telematico dei titoli di Stato (MTS).
1 These are called Specialists in GS 2 ; the status of Specialist implies several obligations and privileges. Among the former, the most important is that Specialists should buy at least 3% of the auctioned securities throughout the year. Other obligations include liquidity provision on both the spot and the repo markets. On the other hand, only Specialists are rewarded by the Treasury with highly remunerative debt management operations.
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The present research aims to provide a method to quantify the value of an important privilege accorded to Specialists, namely their exclusive access to reserved auction reopenings (also known as non-competitive bids) following the auctions of medium-long-term bonds. 4 The reserved reopening gives to the Specialists the right to buy predetermined additional quantities of GS at the price settled at the auction. The application deadline is fixed at 3.30 p.m. of the business day following the auction.
As pointed out by Mohanty (2002) , the issue of whether and to what extent noncompetitive bids should be allowed depends on specific objectives. Some countries' objective is to encourage retail participation and protect them from the winner's curse. Other countries, 3 like Italy, allow primary dealers to participate in non-competitive bids as a special privilege for their market-making role. From the issuer's point of view, the reserved reopening mechanism could increase the investor base by attracting those investors who would otherwise stay away from the auction, fearing that the price would be too high; it also increases the certainty about full subscription of the issue.
Following the intuition by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) that many claims can be thought of as contingent claims, the reopening mechanism can be modelled as a call option written by the Treasury with a strike price equal to the marginal price 5 of the auction. Since bond options are sensitive to movements in the underlying interest rate, the option pricing requires the selection of a model for the term structure of interest rates. As reviewed either in academic literature (Sundaresan, 2000; and Rebonato, 2003) and in publications for the financial industry (for instance, Brigo and Mercurio, 2007) , there exists a vast literature about term structure models. After a brief comparison between the exploitable arbitrage conditions, the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) framework (CIR) is chosen. This model guarantees positive interest rates and closed form solutions for both the price of bonds and of bond options. In addition, as this model was applied to Italian data in different points of time, the present work could be directly comparable to several studies. In particular, I
consider as benchmark studies Barone, Cuoco and Zautzik (1991) , and Bernaschi, Torosantucci and Uboldi (2007) . This model choice is also motivated by data availability.
Indeed, as data on derivatives written on Italian bonds are not available, I chose a model whose parameters can be estimated using the available bond prices. More specifically, I
estimate the one-factor time-homogeneous version of the CIR model through the non-linear least squares method by cross-section on daily closing bond prices, as quoted on the MTS.
Even if, for the sake of option pricing, it is needed to calibrate the model just in correspondence of the auction days, I do it for all the trading days in the period 2004-2005. The goal is to assess the performance of the chosen model for the term structure of interest rates and to contrast it with the two benchmark studies.
I find that on some days the CIR model fits worse the data with respect to other days in the sample. I put forward, as possible explanations, either an intrinsic lack of the model, or, when these days correspond to auction dates, price manipulation by strategic market makers as in Drudi and Massa (2005) . The analysis of the model residuals does not accept the hypothesis of a severe lack of the model in fitting the data, and only partially explains the 5 BTPs are auctioned through marginal (or uniform price) auction system, see below for further details.
poorer performance in terms of insufficient liquidity of some assets. Since only aggregated data are available, the hypothesis of price manipulation is tested indirectly focusing on auctioned GS. Evidence suggests that auctioned GS do not significantly affect the goodness of fit of the model.
Once ruled out the possibility of obtaining misleading parameters from the model, the CIR pricing formula along with the Jamshidian (1989) result are exploited to compute the price of the call option written on the auctioned bonds. In particular, these are medium and long term fixed coupon bonds, BTPs (Buoni Poliennali del Tesoro), and 2-year zero coupon bonds, CTZs (Certificati del Tesoro Zero Coupon). The option value turns out to be significantly different from zero and higher for coupon bonds with respect to zero coupon bonds.
In addition, the pricing of this privilege is useful to evaluate the complex interplay between the issuer and the Primary Dealers. A visible effect is the mispricing detected when the prices at which Treasury bonds are sold in auction are higher (overpricing, see Pacini, 2007) or lower (underpricing, see Drudi and Massa, 1995; Scalia, 1998; and Pacini, 2006) than the when-issued 6 or secondary market prices. Since Specialists get almost the entire auction, the sign of mispricing presumably depends on the above-mentioned obligations and privileges. For instance, overpricing may be partially explained by Specialists aggressive behaviour during the auction to obtain the right to participate to other special issues. 7 The quantitative measurement of such obligations and privileges, in terms of cost and profits, is then necessary to make a complete assessment of the whole placement mechanism. The pricing of the option implicit in the reserved auction reopening is part of this assessment. It turns out that the benefits from the option balance, at least partially, the costs from overpricing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 investigates the characteristics of the reopening mechanism, surveys the most popular approaches to model the term structure of interest rates, and presents the pricing model; section 3 describes the dataset and discusses the performance of the chosen model; section 4 works out the value of the reserved reopening; section 5 relates the results to the mispricing phenomenon; section 6 concludes.
6 These prices relate to new lines of GS that will be issued in the following days but that are already traded on the so called when-issued or gray market. The purpose is to enhance the price formation on the primary market. 7 Among the various criteria, the Treasury ranks Specialists according to the quantity they are awarded in the auctions. The higher ranked gain the privilege to participate in other particular and highly remunerative operations on the primary market such as syndicated issuances, buybacks, operations in derivatives and in foreign currency.
Reserved Auction Reopening and Pricing Model
In this section I analyse the reserved reopening mechanism and I make some assumptions in order to quantify its value. Moreover, after a brief review of the literature about the term structure models of interest rates, I present selected model.
The reserved reopening mechanism
In 1994 the reserved reopening (henceforth RR) was introduced as a privilege for the Overall, the participation in RRs is around 44% and it is higher for coupon bonds with respect to zero coupon bonds. When Specialists submit bids for the RR, it is usually for the whole available quantity. Indeed, partial exercise ranges from about 10% for BTPs to about 38% for CTZs. 8 The last two columns of the table report the total quantity offered in RRs and the quantity allotted to Specialists. Only around one third of the offered quantity is effectively allotted. There are a few reasons why the privilege is not exercised or only partially exercised.
For instance, Specialists are evaluated according to the quantity they buy in the ordinary auction, therefore they have an incentive to bid aggressively even if they have not a final investor who is buying the issued bonds. This generates inventory costs. bought in RR does not enter in such evaluation, the RR privilege is exercised when either the inventory costs are low or the Specialist can profit from it.
The participation in the RR is a right to buy, and it is not mandatory. Therefore, following the intuition by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) that many claims can be thought of as contingent claims, the RR privilege can be considered as plain vanilla call option written by the Italian Treasury. In order to value it, we need to figure out the option type, the strike price, the expiration date, and the quantity of the underlying asset. The RR gives to Specialists the right to buy a predetermined quantity of the auctioned bond at the price settled at the auction. Hence, the option strike price should equal the marginal price. However, the marginal price includes a placement fee that the Treasury pays to the Bank of
Italy. This fee is due as reimbursement to the Specialists; in fact, they cannot apply subscription fees to their final clients. 10 Therefore, the strike price of the option is the difference between the marginal price and this fee. Table 2 .2 reports the timeline of the RR mechanism. The option can be exercised from 11.00 a.m. of the auction day to 3.30 p.m. of the following business day, hence it lasts about one day.
11 In principle, each Specialist is able to exercise the option at any time. For instance, as soon as the underlying asset price on the secondary market exceeds the strike price, he just has to short sell the underlying and place a bid for the RR. Thus, we might decide to model 9 BTPs are auctioned through a marginal auction system. The marginal auction settles that all the requests are auctioned at the same price, the marginal price. Every dealer can submit a maximum of 3 bids. The marginal price is determined by satisfying bids starting from the highest price until the total amount of bids accepted equals the amount offered. The price of the last successful bid is the marginal price. 10 The fee is equal to twenty basis points for the 3-year BTPs and CTZs, thirty for the 5-year BTPs and forty for the remaining securities. 11 Since in the pricing formula the option's time to expiration is measured in days, the change in the time for the participation in the RR 14 In what follows it will be assumed that:
1. The option is evaluated on the day of the ordinary auction at 11.00 a.m.;
2. The option is evaluated from the Specialists' viewpoint;
3. The option is written on a bond whose face value is 100.
Assumption 2 implies that GS that tend to be mispriced by pricing models because they are illiquid should not be excluded from the sample. In effect, a financial institution also buys and sells illiquid bonds, and the term structure estimation should also consider this kind of securities.
Review of literature
As reviewed by Sundaresan (2000) , in certain core areas in finance, such as derivatives valuation and term structure theory, continuous-time methods have proved to be "the most attractive way to conduct research and gain economic intuition". In this framework, the seminal contributions on option pricing by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) set the beginning of a large literature in this area of research. These scholars, by forming a portfolio of the underlying stock coupled with borrowing, and continuously rebalancing the 12 In addition, the underlying securities make no payments during the life of the option, hence early exercise is never optimal and European and American calls have the same value (Merton, 1973) . 13 Country experience suggests that a limit of 20% is generally preferred for RRs to ensure that competition would not be reduced. Some countries also prefer to place a limit on the quantum of non-competitive bids by any individual bidder (Mohanty, 2002 portfolio, show that the payoffs of a call option can be replicated. Until Ross (1976a, 1976b) introduced the idea of risk-neutral valuation, the use of replicating portfolios was the basis for valuing options. Only a few years later Harrison and Kreps (1979) developed a theoretical framework for risk-neutral pricing, and clarified its connection to no-arbitrage in models with continuous trading.
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Until now only Brandolini (2004) attempted to work out the value of the RR as a call option, and she assumed the framework of Black and Scholes (1973 The selection of a proper model involves a number of considerations. With respect to the arbitrage condition, there are two approaches that can be followed, the classical and the HJM (Heat, Jarrow and Morton, 1992) ones. In the classical approach, a risk-adjusted model for spot rate under the risk neutral martingale measure is worked out from the price of arbitrage-free bonds. This approach requires the estimation of the drift and the volatilities of the spot rate dynamics, dr t . Moreover, the spot rate is assumed to be Markovian, and consequently dr t depends only on r t . The fundamental theorem of asset pricing places no restrictions on what the drift should be since the spot rate is not the price of an asset. The advantage of this method is that one is able to price interest sensitive instruments without considering the markets for these securities; therefore it could be helpful in determining the price of the implicit option that, by definition, is not traded. Furthermore, it takes the advantage of the liquidity of the Italian secondary GS market. However, the traditional approach has several disadvantages. For instance, the drift of the instantaneous spot rate under 15 In their paper, they show that the absence of arbitrage implies the existence of a risk-neutral probability measure. This technique is now extensively used for pricing options. 16 Longstaff (1993) documents the different properties of option prices computed in the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) term structure framework with those implied by the Black-Scholes model. the risk-neutral martingale measure is not directly observable, thus it is almost impossible to verify the consistency of the assumed dynamics with time series data.
The HJM, on the other hand, exploits the arbitrage relation between forward rates and bond prices to impose restrictions on the dynamics of instantaneous forward rates directly. By doing this, it eliminates the need to model the expected rate of change of r t , but volatilities remain to be estimated. The HJM approach has been later applied to discrete-tenor forward rates in a series of studies that started with the seminal paper by Brace, Gatarek and Musiela (1997) . Models based on assumptions regarding the evolution of discrete-tenor forward rates are known as BGM models, market models or LIBOR market models. The modern approach has several advantages over the classical approach. For instance, the consistency of the assumed dynamics for forward rates with time series data can be easily verified because the volatilities of forward rates are the same under the martingale measure and under the true (historical) probability measure. Moreover, an exact fit of the initial term structure is obtained by construction, since the initial forward curve is exogenous to the model. One disadvantage of the modern pricing approach is that arbitrary specifications of the forward rate volatilities will in general lead to non-Markovian dynamics, thus requiring the simulation of a large number of state variables. Among the others Sundaresan (2000), Rebonato (2003) , and Brigo and Mercurio (2007) provide a review and analysis of these issues.
The CIR model
Within the classical framework, the chosen model is the one-factor time-homogeneous CIR. 17 The general equilibrium model, developed by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) , led to the introduction of a square root term in the diffusion coefficient of the instantaneous shortrate dynamics proposed by Vasicek in 1977. The resulting model has been a benchmark for many years, as it remains useful because of its analytical tractability and the fact that, contrary
to Vasicek (1977) , the spot rate is always positive. Moreover, it provides closed form solutions for both the price of bonds and of bond options. In addition, several previous studies apply this model to Italian data, hence the present work could be directly comparable to them.
In particular, I consider as benchmark studies Barone, Cuoco and Zautzik (1991) , henceforth BCZ, and Bernaschi, Torosantucci and Uboldi (2007) .
This model choice is also motivated by data availability. Although GS secondary market prices at various frequencies are available from different data vendors 18 , and daily data can be found for free on the internet 19 , derivatives written on the Italian GS are mainly traded over the counter, thus data are not easily available. This limited the selection to a model whose parameters can be estimated using only bond prices.
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Under the CIR model the instantaneous interest rate, r t , follows the square root process described by the following stochastic differential equation:
where κ is the speed of adjustment of the interest rate towards its long-run average θ, t r σ is the volatility of changes in the instantaneous interest rate, and dw t is a standardized Wiener process. Moreover, if 0 < κ < 1, the process is mean-reverting, i.e. the interest rate converges to its long-run value θ. The CIR model possesses an affine term structure 21 , that is the price of a pure discount bond with residual maturity τ = T-t can be written as: 
This means that the price of a pure discount bond with residual maturity τ is a function of the state variable, r, and of the three parameters, φ 1 , φ 2 and φ 3 , where:
and -λ is the market price of risk. Given P(r,t,T) the whole term structure of interest rates, R(r,t,T), can be worked out using the well known relationship:
In particular, this implies that the instantaneous and the long-term rates are respectively:
The CIR parameters have been estimated with different methods. For estimations using non-linear regression techniques, see Brown and Dybvig (1986) , Brown and Schaefer (1994) and, on Italian data, BCZ (1989 BCZ ( , 1991 and Bernaschi, Torosantucci and Uboldi (2007) . This method provides a time-series estimates of the unknown parameters, and it does not allow for a constant relation among the variables over the total observation period, because it is not possible to consider the temporal information contained in bond prices. Both de Munnik and Schotman (1994) and Zeytun and Gupta (2007) contrast the cross-sectional and the time series estimation of both the CIR and Vasicek models. 22 An alternative approach, based on the generalized method of moments (GMM), has been used by Longstaff (1989) , Logstaff and Schwartz (1992) , and Gibbons and Ramaswamy (1993) . This approach implies placing some restrictions on the moments of bond yields. However, the procedure has some difficulties in valuing long-term coupon bonds. On Italian data, Gentile and Renò (2005) adopt the efficiency method of moments developed by Gallant and Tauchen (1996) . A maximum likelihood approach, to estimate a multifactor version of the CIR model, has been proposed by Chen and Scott (1993) and Pearson and Sun (1994) . The maximum likelihood method combines time series information and cross-sectional information, but its implementation is rather complex. Lamoureux and Witte (2002) , instead, use advances in Bayesian estimation methods to exploit both time-series and cross-sectional restrictions of the CIR model. Finally, Ananthanarayanan and Schwartz (1980) develop a two-stage method.
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I adopt the one-stage approach developed by Brown and Dybvig (1986) . This assumes that if we consider a coupon bond that entitles the holder to a vector of remaining payments, cf, to be received in a vector of dates, d, the value of such bond at time t is equal to:
Consistently, a zero coupon bond can be represented as a bond with a single payment at its maturity date. To estimate the parameters of the model, it is assumed that the bond market price V at time t deviate by the model price V * by an error term, ε t :
While Brown and Dybvig assume that the error term is zero-mean and independent and identically distributed as a Normal, I follow BCZ (1989 BCZ ( , 1991 and assume that pricing errors are increasing in the bond's duration. This is equivalent to assume that a pricing error is smaller the closer is the bond maturity date. Therefore, in order to make the error term 22 Zeytun and Gupta (2007) , for instance, suggest that if data are not smooth and well-behaved, time dependent models would be better in explaining the features of the term structure. 23 Among the others, Overbeck and Ryden (1997) compare the asymptotic properties of various estimators.
homoskedastic, both sides of the previous equation should be divided by the square root of the product between the modified duration and the cum-coupon price of the bond. The resulting model is of the kind:
where X is the cash flows' matrix, P the vector of prices, β the vector of the parameters, and u the error term. Since quoted prices are clean prices, i.e. they do not incorporate the coupon that has been maturing from the last payment date, this must be taken into account when estimating the CIR parameters. 
Option price
Given the calibrated parameters it is possible to price the option. Let c(r,t,T,s,K) be the price of a call option with strike price K and maturity T, written on a pure discount bond with maturity s (s > T > t). As in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) the price of this option is:
where
is the non-central chi-square distribution function valued at point d, with df degree of freedom and non-centrality parameter nc. These parameters are specified by Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) as 25 : (20)
where r * is the critical interest rate below which the option will be exercised, and it is obtained solving K = P(r * ,T, s). The option formulation tells us that the replicating strategy is simply to buy Since the options to be considered here are written on coupon bonds, we have to take it into account. In particular, it can be proved that in one-factor models the option written on a coupon bond is equivalent to a portfolio of options on pure discount bonds (Jamshidian, 1989) 26 :
where cf j is the bond's payment at time s j (T < s q ≤ s j ≤ s m ), r * is the solution of
Hence, given the formula for the price of a call option on pure discount bonds, we obtain: Longstaff (1993) obtains the same formula through a different approach.
Since the model parameters are estimated cross-sectionally on a daily basis, we should focus on auction days only. However, the model is calibrated over all the days in the sample.
The goal is to assess its performance against previous studies on Italian data. In this section I present the data, and then I discuss the calibration results. This data source is probably the most informative since it refers to the market where Specialists are selected and have to fulfil their obligations.
Data
Index linked bonds are excluded from the sample. For each trading day the dataset includes the closing mid price 30 of all the bonds and notes traded that day, the time to maturity, the settlement date, the coupon payments and the day counting market conventions.
Moreover, the dataset provides information about the accrued interest and the modified duration. When these two quantities were missing, they were computed using the closing mid price. The dataset includes from 58 to 68 securities per day and covers a wide range of 27 RRs that for calendar reason are made on the same day of the ordinary auction are not considered. 28 For a review and assessment on the functioning and liquidity of MTS Italy market, see Coluzzi, Ginebri and Turco (2008) . 29 For further details on MTS Time Series, see Dufour and Skinner (2004) . 30 These are based on the average of best bid/offer prices at or before 5 p.m. CET.
maturities. 31 In particular the sample comprises 3-6-month and 1-year BOTs, 2-year CTZs, and 3-5-10-15-30-year BTPs. The bonds are ordered by quote date and then by maturity date.
Intra-day data at a 5-minute frequency are used, instead, to work out the mispricing between the primary and the secondary market.
Calibration results
I estimate the model parameters through the non-linear least squares method by crosssection on each day in the sample. 32 Thus, the parameters are assumed to be constant over time in the derivation of the equilibrium pricing model. This is consistent with the assumption of taking the Specialist viewpoint. Indeed, this approach is similar to standard practice among option traders, who re-estimate volatilities every day or use implicit standard deviations as a basis for trading although their pricing model assumes constant volatilities. In addition, in the period under analysis the instantaneous interest rate displays a correlation of 83% with the 1-month, 90% with the 2-month and about 94% with the 3-month Euribor rates. 35 This is an index of the goodness of the model. Consistently, the model volatilities decrease along with interest rates. Since the model, on average, tends to underestimate the short term rate, it might be expected that, on average, the theoretical prices are higher than the market prices.
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31 On average the bond maturities range about from 23 days to 30 years. 32 The calibration starting points are chosen through a stochastic multi-start method, see Appendix. 33 Sercu and Wu (1997) . 34 Note that in that period the Bank of Italy official rate was above 10%. 35 Source: elaboration on daily data from Reuters. The correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level. (27) where N is the number of bonds in each cross-section. Figure 3 .2 shows the evolution of the sse. The latter is of interest in that it shows some regularity in 2004. The highest peaks, i.e. the peaks in the last 5% of the sse distribution, occur mainly in the middle of the month, that is when the 5-year BTPs are auctioned. This tells us that during these particular days the theoretical prices generated by the CIR model are affected by a larger mispricing with respect to the market prices. This might be of concern for the issuer, since a correct pricing of GS is extremely important especially around auction days. Indeed, the secondary market prices play an important role for the formation of the price on the primary market. The triangles indicate the day before an auction takes place; as it will be explained in the following, these days provide the input parameters for the option pricing. Apart from two cases, these days seems not particularly affected by high values in the sse. However, some robustness check are conducted to ensure that the call pricing is not systematically affected by a poor model fitting. 36 Recall that sse is the score function to be minimized in the one-stage approach. A common explanation for a poor model fitting performance is the inclusion of illiquid assets in the cross-section of GS. Figure 3 .3 plots the residuals of the model computed as the difference between the market price, V, and the, theoretical price, V*, against the bonds time to maturity. In general, theoretical prices are overvalued with respect to market prices, this is consistent with the fact that the short term interest rate is on average below the Euribor rates. 37 Mispricing is more evident for medium and long-term instruments, BTPs, as they approach their maturity. On the contrary, shorter term securities, BOTs, seldom show high mispricing. This is typically due to liquidity problems. In effect, it is reasonable to expect that short term GS are more actively traded, thus better priced, than longer-term BTPs. In effect, these latter GS are mainly retained in investors' portfolios as their maturity approaches. Some
BTPs maturing in the next 15-30 years probably suffer as well from liquidity problems. This explain part of the peaks in the sse. In fact, the highest peak in figure 3 .2 is largely due to the mispricing a 30-year BTP with 20 years to maturity. However, since some peaks occur around auction days, it is worth considering other sources of mispricing.
37 See For instance, it is interesting to verify if mispricing is affecting the model parameters because of Specialists behaving strategically to manipulate prices. Drudi and Massa (2005) show that informed dealers act strategically on the primary and secondary Italian GS markets.
For the period 1994-1996 they provide evidence of price manipulation on the more transparent secondary market when the less transparent primary market is open. The peaks of mispricing around auction days could be a result of such a manipulation. As data disaggregated at the dealer level are not available here, it is not possible to perform a direct check. However, if manipulation occurs, one possible implication is that mispricing, and as a consequence high sse, are driven by the auctioned securities. Thus, we are able to check whether auctioned GS influence the CIR parameters when the primary market is open. An intuitive way to proceed is to calibrate the model excluding the auctioned securities.
Accordingly, I selected the first day before the auction, the auction day and the RR day, then I eliminated the auctioned GS from each of the three days, and, finally, I calibrated again the CIR model. In principle, as each cross-section has a minimum of 58 GS and the maximum number of auctioned securities per day is 2, we may expect that only a huge price manipulation on this two GS could affect the model parameters. In effect, the improvement in the sse, after controlling for the number of securities, is small: the sse falls in 32% of the days in the sample, but the magnitude of the improvement is in the order of 10 -6 and the mean difference is not statistically different from zero. It can be concluded that, in this sample, model fitting is not significantly affected by the auctioned securities.
The remaining question is the following: is it proper to delete from the database the securities that show high mispricing and calibrate again the parameters? Obviously, these "outliers" can produce a misleading term structure, but the market is also characterized by anomalous and relevant data, for instance due to liquidity problems. 38 Since it is assumed that the option pricing is considered from the point of view of a Specialist, no security is deleted from the sample.
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Option pricing
Given the parameters calibrated in the previous section, I can price the option implicitly granted by the Treasury to the Specialists using equation (25). From Assumption 1 follows that I have to rely on data that are the closer in time to the auction, thus I use the parameters calibrated on the business day that precedes the ordinary auction. The results of the option pricing are reported in Table 4 .1. The first two columns contain a description of the auctioned bond, in particular if it is a coupon bond or a zero coupon bond, the maturity date, the coupon rate and the original maturity in years. The third column reports the date of the ordinary auction. Columns 4 to 9 include the four parameters resulting from the calibration of the CIR model, the volatility of changes in the instantaneous interest rate and the long run value of the instantaneous interest rate. The option's strike price and the option value are, respectively, in the last two columns. 38 As for the benchmark studies, BCZ (1991) filter the data looking at the spread on return: if some bonds have spread on return greater than 2.57 times their standard deviation, the observation with greater spread on return is rejected and the regression to determine the model parameters is repeated. The rejection procedure is repeated recursively, until all outliers are erased. Bernaschi, Torosantucci and Uboldi (2007) do not delete any security. 39 As a robustness check I calibrated the model and estimated the option value excluding, for each day, the two securities that exhibit the highest mispricing in absolute value. On average the option prices are only marginally affected. Note: The original maturity is expressed in years. The CIR parameters are calibrated on the business day that precedes the auction. The option value is computed for a security of face value equal to 100. The instantaneous and the long run interest rates are in %. The latter, θ, is worked out under the assumption that the market price of risk is zero. Table 4 .2 reports summary statistics for the option value. The table shows that this is significantly different from zero. Such a result is not trivial, since the option lasts one day only and its value is an increasing function of its time to expiration (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985) . 40 Both in mean and in median, the option value is increasing in the original maturity of the bond. This is probably due to the fact that long term bonds pay, on average, higher coupons for a higher number of cash flows. Longstaff (1993) analyses comparative statics properties of call and put prices in the CIR framework. The author finds that coupon bond call values are increasing functions of coupon size. The intuition is that an increase in the cash flows size increases the value of the underlying asset, and has a corresponding effect on option values. Call values reported in table 4.1 are on average increasing in coupon size both for 5 and 10-year BTPs. 41 Moreover, the call value is higher for BTPs than for CTZs. 
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The mispricing between the primary and the secondary GS markets
In the previous section, I found that the option implicitly granted by the Italian Treasury has value that is different from zero. In this section, instead, I rely on a subsample of the estimated option prices to discuss the value of the option in terms of the complex interplay between the issuer and the Specialists. The pricing of this privilege may be useful in evaluating the visible effect of this interplay, the so called mispricing. Note that now mispricing is not referred to as the difference between theoretical and market prices. On the contrary, there is mispricing when the prices at which GS are sold in auction are higher (overpricing, see Pacini, 2007) or lower (underpricing, see Drudi and Massa, 2005; Scalia, 1998; and Pacini, 2006) than the when-issued or secondary market prices. While underpricing is interpreted as a reward for the Specialists intermediation activity between the primary and 40 Longstaff (1993) shows that the value of the call in the CIR framework is increasing in the time to expiration only if this is large enough. 41 This result also holds if we consider median values. 42 Other comparative statics properties include the call value being a decreasing function of strike price, coupon payment date and riskless interest rate, and an increasing functions of σ 2 . Since these parameters change altogether over the sample, it is not possible to investigate these implications.
the secondary markets, overpricing might generate money losses in Specialists' balance sheet. This is particularly likely when Specialists have not a final customer for the auctioned GS.
The mispricing between the primary and the secondary market of GS is detected in different countries. Goldreich (2007) Since Specialists get almost the entire auction, the sign of mispricing presumably depends on the system of obligations and privileges set by the Treasury. For instance, overpricing can be partially explained by Specialists aggressive behaviour during the auction in order to obtain the right to participate in other special issues. Thus, the quantitative measurement of such obligations and privileges, in terms of costs and profits, is necessary in order to make a complete assessment of the whole placement mechanism. The pricing of the option implicit in the RRs is part of this assessment. Table 5 .1 reports a comparison between mispricing and the value of the option. 43 The third column reports the tranche of issuance; this is made of two numbers because the RR is counted as a new tranche issued of the same bond, therefore the first number refers to the ordinary auction and the second to the corresponding RR. Mispricing is computed as the difference between the price of the security on the primary market, i.e. the marginal price minus the placement fee, and the price on the secondary market on the auction day. In particular, the price on the secondary market is computed as the average of the best bid prices registered at a 5 minute frequency on MTS Italy between 10.25 a.m. and 10.55 a.m.. I use the bid price because this is the price a Specialist would offer to pay in order to buy the security on the secondary market. 44 The difference is almost always positive, hence supporting previous findings. 45 The question of interest is: does the option value account for part of these costs from overpricing? In other words, do the benefits coming from the positive value of the option explain (at least partially), the costs from overpricing? In order to answer, the overall benefit from the option, column 8, is computed as the product between the option value and 43 The options on GS whose secondary price is not available in the dataset are excluded from the sample. 44 Goldreich (2007) observes that the most relevant measure of mispricing is relative to the quoted bid, because it measures the different performance of Treasury and Specialist as sellers of GS. 45 The magnitude and sign of mispricing depend on the measurement procedure. Pacini (2007) measures mispricing over different time periods. He always finds a significantly positive mispricing for Italy.
the number of bonds offered 46 in the RR. At the same time, the cost from overpricing, column 9, is the product between the amount issued in the ordinary auction and mispricing. It turns out that, for the longest maturities, the benefits often outweigh the costs. For CTZs, instead, this is never the case. Note: The original maturity is expressed in years. The option value is computed for a security of face value equal to 100. The issued amount, the cost of mispricing and the benefit from the option are in millions of euro. Mispricing is in euros.
In Table 5 .2 I collect the results by bond type. Apart from the costs of overpricing for the 5-year BTPs, costs and benefits are statistically different from zero at the 5% level.
Interestingly, on average the advantages from the option outweigh the costs of overpricing for 5 and 10-year coupon bonds. For zero coupon bonds, instead, the advantages from the RR are well below the costs of overpricing. Since the mean values might be affected by outliers either in the option or in the mispricing valuations, median values are also reported. When considering the median values, the costs from mispricing are always above the option benefits. It can be concluded that the option implicitly granted to the Specialists is able to compensate, at least partially, the costs coming from aggressive bidding in the ordinary auction. In particular, for 10 and 5-year BTPs the median benefit from the option value is above 75% of the cost from overpricing. This figure falls to about 50% for 3-year BTPs and it is only 1.4% for CTZs. Since Specialists participate in the auctions for all the GS in the sample, overall in median about 72% of the costs from overpricing are compensated by the option value. It is important to stress that this comparison between costs and benefits is somehow theoretical. Indeed, as showed in Table 2 .1, not always the RR right is exercised. In the period under analysis only one third of the quantity offered in the RR was allotted. Interestingly, the bond segments with higher option value are not only the segments where the costs are balanced for a larger part by the option benefit, but also the segments whose RR total exercise rate is higher. Therefore, the Specialists recognize the option value, but this is only partially exploited. However, the RR is not the only privilege accorded to Specialists. Indeed, as long as the RR is accorded to all the Specialists, some of them also profit from other highly remunerative privileges. 47 Thus, Specialists, as a whole, profit from their status. These findings indicate that the disadvantages coming from the overpricing phenomenon are played down by the system of privileges accorded to Specialists. In addition, the benefits for
Specialists are further amplified in the measure that the costs of overpricing are borne by the final customers.
Conclusions
A number of obligations and privileges are attached to the status of Specialist in GS.
This paper focused on a major privilege that has received scant attention by the academic In the second part of the paper, I worked out the option value, and I related it to the mispricing phenomenon. It turns out that, although the short life, the option has a value significantly different from zero for each kind of security. This value is higher for coupon bonds with respect to zero coupon bonds and it is increasing in the original maturity of the security. Moreover, the option value helps in explaining the overpricing occurring between 47 Pacini (2007) provides an estimate of the benefits coming from the admission of highly ranked Specialists to syndicated placements. He finds that for Italy in 2004 about 60% of the total costs of overpricing are covered by the profits from participating in syndicated issues. This result is particularly remarkable, as it is generated by 6 syndications only.
the primary and secondary markets. Indeed, the cost-benefit analysis showed that the benefits from the option cover, in median, 70% of the costs from aggressive bidding on the primary market. For coupon bonds with longer maturities the option value covers in median more than 99% of these costs. For zero coupon bonds this figure falls to about 1.4%. In general, the segments characterized by higher option value experience higher RR exercise rate. The reverse is true for CTZs, whose option value is close to zero and it is less exercised. In addition, if we also consider the revenues from participation in syndicated operations (as computed in Pacini, 2007) , the disadvantages coming from the overpricing phenomenon are played down to a large extent by the system of privileges accorded to Specialists.
However, only one third of the quantity offered in RR over the sample period is allotted. Therefore, even though Specialists are aware of the option value, it can be concluded that this is only partially exploited. Assuming an interest of the Treasury in increasing the option exercise rate, for instance to increase the outstanding of a new issue, a policy implication might be to create a market for these options, i.e. to allow Specialists to sell their privilege. On the contrary, the Treasury could assign this benefit only to highly ranked Specialists in order to foster competition on the primary market.
The present analysis can be extended in different directions. First of all, a different choice for the term structure of interest rates model can be implemented. 48 In particular, it might be interesting to see if adding factors helps in improving the fit of the model. This comes at the cost that the Jamshidian (1989) result can no longer be applied, thus the price for options on coupon bonds should be evaluated numerically. Another extension would be the use of a model that ensures the perfect fit of the initial term structure. However, this might be difficult to calibrate with the Italian data available. Secondly, a natural extension of this research is a cross-country analysis. Indeed, the procedure here developed for the RR privilege easily extends to other countries with analogous primary dealer system (for eurozone countries see Bagella et al., 2007) . This could be also appealing for the analysis of the mispricing between the primary and the secondary GS markets, which is a widespread phenomenon, too.
48 Preliminary analysis in the Vasicek framework shows that the prices of call options written on 10-year BTPs are on average the same as in the CIR framework.
selection criterion I used, accordingly with the non-linear least squares method, the sum of squared errors. I repeated this procedure 100 times. The output was a file containing 101 different values for each parameter on each day and a file including the time series of the best set of parameters. This procedure allows each set of parameters to come from a different vector of starting points. In order to check for the stability of the obtained parameters, I also counted the number of revisions on parameters coming from the 101 simulations: these are on average 5. As a robustness check, I repeated this procedure 10,000 times on a single day. I had revisions only in 1% of the calibrations. Moreover, even when a revision occurred the change in the parameters was negligible. Table A .1 reports summary statistics on pricing errors computed using the "optimal" set of parameters. 
